# 1NC---Dartmouth---Round 4

## DA---Buddhism

### Consequentialism Bad

#### Use virtue ethics.

Fierke ’22 [Karin; 2022; Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews; Snapshots from Home: Mind, Action and Strategy in an Uncertain World, “Mind/No-Mind,” Ch. 2]

The ethical paradox is expressed in a puzzle from the Zen Buddhist Dogen. The puzzle revolves around the need to choose between culling a population of deer that have grown too large or letting them live, knowing that they would harm the ecology of a small Scottish island which was being devastated by the overpopulation of deer. What is the ethical answer to the need for action in a context where loss of life will be the outcome of any decision? James (2004) argues that the Zen Buddhist could be justified in choosing to cull the deer if she did so out of compassion for the deer or out of concern to preserve the island’s ecosystem. Balance is the key issue here. There are plenty of examples of death and harm in nature and, in this respect, death, the culmination of thermodynamic decay, is a part of life. There is, however, a difference between death as a part of the natural balance that restores itself and death from violence for instrumental ends and profit.

Modern ethics in the West has been primarily concerned with providing rules or first principles that set out how we ought to act. Acts can then be measured against the rule to determine the degree of correspondence. Such practices will not be effective in a context of radical uncertainty. If the defining feature of modern ethics has been a concern with what is right, Zen Buddhism, according to James (2004), represents a form of virtue ethics, which has a counterpart among the ancient Greeks. Virtue ethics is concerned less with good outcomes than with what constitutes a good life, or in the case of Buddhism, an enlightened life. An enlightened life might include qualities of acting mindfully, with compassion and integrity. Paradoxically, the self that seeks the good life is empty of essence, impermanent and, in the context of this snapshot, engaged in violence and war. A Buddhist virtue ethics provides practical wisdom about acting differently that flows from seeing the world differently, free of distorting attachments. Detaching from one’s separateness and assumed intrinsic identity comes with a potential to be more selfless and compassionate. The path can’t be encapsulated in a set of rules but is instead developed through skill and practice, and not least through calming the mind and developing the power of concentration.

#### Endorsing kuśala creates profound value as an act of personal meditation regardless of consequences---infinite value is impossible to consequentially evaluate and cultivating relationality is precious.

Hershock ’21 [Peter; 2021; director of the Asian Studies Development Program at the East-West Center; Buddhism and Intelligent Technology: Toward a More Humane Future, “Buddhism: A Philosophical Repertoire,” p. 38-41]

To embody wisdom and enact moral clarity requires attentive mastery. We will later discuss the roles played by focus- and flexibility-oriented meditation practices in realizing Buddhist ideals of personal presence. Here, anticipating critical engagement with the dynamics of the attention economy, it is enough to stress that attention training is integral to the processes of physical, emotional, and intellectual dehabituation that are needed to be freely responsive. The Pali and Sanskrit term for attention, manasikāra, simply means awareness that is concentrated or resolutely focused. This implies that one can be attentive with different degrees of concentration or focus. We can devote half our attention to cooking and half to conversing. But in addition to how much attention we are paying to our situation, Buddhism makes a distinction qualitatively between being attentive in ways that bind us to or that free us from conflict, trouble, and suffering.

It is possible, even without training, to be keenly attentive to our present circumstances. Young children avidly awaiting the ice-cream cone being prepared for them and adolescents in the throes of video game ecstasy are both clearly capable of highly concentrated attention. What is not so clear is whether they are freely attentive or compulsively so. Without training, our attention is readily and involuntarily attracted or distracted. In particular, we are especially susceptible to unwisely having our attention captured by the superficial, craving-inducing aspects of things (ayoniśomanasikāra). This, as we will see, is crucial to the workings of the new attention economy being realized through intelligent technology. Yet, with training, our attention can also be wisely concentrated—directed freely and intentionally in ways that are both sensitive to the interdependent origins of things and consistent with truing relational patterns (yoniśomanasikāra).

To the extent that Buddhist ethics consists in the goalless, nirvana-oriented practice of integrally cultivating wisdom, moral clarity, and attentive mastery, it is hard to place readily or without remainder into one of the standard categories of ethics grounded on definitive and generalized judgments regarding personal character (virtue ethics), duties (deontological ethics), or the consequences of actions (utilitarianism). Given Buddhism’s ethical insistence on pairing wisdom with compassion, a closer fit might be care ethics, with its emphasis on situationally apt attentive responsiveness. But Buddhist compassion is not reducible to the natural inclinations to care about and for others that are invoked by care ethics, much less to the abstractly mandated responses to suffering that are typically framed with reference to personal virtues or duties, or derived through a consequentialist calculus of harms and happiness. Rather, Buddhist compassion is exemplified in the ongoing intentional practice of dissolving the karmic causes and conditions of shared conflict, trouble, and suffering—a necessarily improvisational labor of shared predicament resolution in steadfast pursuit of increasingly liberating relational outcomes and opportunities.

What makes Buddhist ethics so difficult to place (and, potentially, so relevant today) is the fact that it offers only an open-ended training program—cultivating wisdom, moral clarity, and attentive mastery—and a set of “cardinal points” for discriminating qualitatively among relational outcomes and opportunities. Especially in early Buddhist contexts, the term used for the “true north” of liberating presence on the Buddhist “moral compass” was kuśala. Often translated as skillful or wholesome or good, kuśala actually functions as a superlative. Rather than connoting something that is good as opposed to mediocre or bad, it connotes virtuosity.

The ethical significance of aiming at kuśala outcomes and opportunities is neatly illustrated in an early Buddhist text, the Sakkapañha Sutta (DN 21). Like most early Buddhist suttas or recounted teachings of the Buddha, the Sakkapañha Sutta is structured as a dialogue. In this case, the Buddha is asked to explain how it can be that human beings generally want to live in harmony and without strife, and seem to have the resources for doing so, they almost always fail and end up embroiled in anger, hatred, and conflict. At first, the Buddha offers his standard psychological account of conflict and social strife as typically being rooted in jealousy and greed, which are in turn dependent on having fixed likes and dislikes, and these on being caught by craving forms of desires and tendencies to dwell on things. But this entire edifice of conditions, he finally explains, ultimately rests on conceptual proliferation (Pali: papañca; Skt: prapañca): compulsively dividing up what is present into ever more finely wrought units and relations among them, producing ever more tightly woven nets of fixed associations and judgments that at once support and entrap the craving- and conflict-defined self. To bring an end to conflict, interpersonal discord, and the suffering they entail, one must uproot prapañca.

When the Buddha is asked how we can stop engaging in conceptual proliferation and enact our intentions to live in peace and harmony, he significantly directs attention away from “inner” psychological conditions to “outer” personal and social consequences. To cut through prapañca, he says, we should continually evaluate our conduct (mental, verbal, and physical) in terms of whether it is bringing about kuśala or akuśala outcomes and opportunities, continuing on courses of actions only if they both decrease akuśala eventualities and increase those that are kuśala. Given that kuśala is a superlative, this means that resolving conflicts and freeing ourselves from trouble and suffering is not simply a matter of refraining from doing bad things and instead doing or being either harmlessly mediocre or what is considered good by current standards. These are all akuśala. Freeing ourselves from conflict, trouble, and suffering requires going beyond current conceptions of good and evil, realizing virtuosically shared presence with and for others. The course correction required is resolutely qualitative.

The aim of Buddhist ethics is to foster the cultivation of wisdom, moral clarity, and attentive mastery, establishing and then continuously enhancing commitments to and capacities for thinking, speaking, and acting as needed to realize superlative or virtuosic (kuśala) relational dynamics. The purpose of ethical deliberation is not to discover or devise absolute or universal standards of conduct. Just as virtuosic musical performances set new standards of musicianship, kuśala ethical conduct sets ever new standards of ethical excellence. A karmic ethics of compassionate virtuosity is an ethics of doing better at what we are already doing best, evaluating value systems and the ways that they are embodied personally and institutionally to realize ways of life that are progressively conducive to relating freely.

#### Consistent applications of virtue ethics make us compassionate.

Long ’21 [William; 2021; Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University; A Buddhist Approach to International Relations, “A Buddhist Alternative,” Ch. 6]

In addition to revolutionary changes in the physical sciences, the life sciences too have made remarkable new discoveries that challenge our thinking about human nature as irreversibly self-interested and expand the possibilities for considering our cooperative potential and corresponding social arrangements. Until relatively recently, the prevailing view in neuroscience was that the brain contained all its neurons at birth, and the number and circuitry of these neurons were set within the first few years of life. Scientists believed that the only lifelong brain changes were minor alterations in synaptic (interneuronal) connections and accelerating cell death with aging. Social scientists in the Western tradition assumed that this relatively fixed brain was, by nature, first and always primarily self-interested and self-serving.

In the 1990s, however, neuroscientists discovered that the brain continues to generate new neurons throughout life (neurogenesis) and that new and existing neurons undergo structural and functional changes in their circuitry in response to their environments, by training and experience (neuroplasticity). Contrary to what was once believed, the brain is highly dynamic (Eriksson et al. 1998). When referring to changes in the brain, it is important to distinguish between gross morphology and cellular structure and function. The overall structure and pattern of brain development is under genetic control and does not change markedly. But our 35,000 genes are not up to the job of prescribing the wiring for the brain’s 100 trillion or more synapses. These connections are shaped by our ongoing experiences. It is at this cellular level that the brain is remarkably plastic. Neuroplasticity refers to altering connections in the brain, the strengthening, withering, or rerouting of synaptic connections.

Neuroplasticity is more than mere learning or storing a memory. The brain is far more flexible than that. It can make wholesale topographical reorganizations throughout life (Elbert et al. 1995). For example, experiments demonstrate that some brain areas that were thought to be “hardwired” for one function can in response to injury and adaptive effort, take on a totally different function, what scientists call cross-modal functional plasticity. Altering connections in the brain in a way that strengthens the efficacy of a neuronal circuit over the long term is the essence of neuroplasticity.

How does the brain accomplish these adaptive feats? Various new technologies are giving us a glimpse of this process. These new technologies are illuminating the neural correlates for specific adaptations wrought through repeated experiences. These technologies can also show us the brain areas and patterns of electrochemical activation associated with a mental process. In discovering and observing the link between brain circuitry and mental states, some scientists are also suggesting that the causal connection between brain and mind works in both directions (Lutz et al. 2004). Specifically, they offer intriguing new evidence to suggest that the processes of brain wiring and rewiring may be shaped by mental (nonphysical) events. This work reveals that it is not just experience that molds the brain. Rather, changes in brain circuitry are generated only when behavior is specifically attended to. Attention (mindfulness), is required for use-dependent brain changes. In fact, imagined physical movements, if repeated with concentration, can produce the same synaptic changes as actual repetitive body movements (Schwartz and Begley 2002; Slotnick 2004). Similarly, mental imagery correlates with the activation of the same brain areas as those associated with the actual perception of the imagined object. In short, mental force appears to express itself through the brain, but it is not reducible to the brain.

Some neuroscientists began looking at the brain activity (“brain state”) and cognitive and neural characteristics (“brain traits”) of meditators to better understand the immediate and long-term effects of focused awareness. These studies produced preliminary evidence for the possibility that mental training may alter brain activity, shape the physical brain, and affect human behavior. Early work by Richard Davidson, Antoine Lutz, and others found that sustained thoughts activated certain neuronal pathways in the brain associated with the regulation of positive affect (like compassion), reduced negative thoughts and feelings such as anxiety and depression, and subdued self-referential thoughts (See Davidson et al. 2003; Pollard 2003; Lutz et al. 2004). These early studies lent support to the notion that a willful refocusing of mental awareness could bring about important changes in brain activity and structure (Brefczynski-Lewis et al. 2007; Lazar et al. 2005).

These initial investigations have led to hundreds of recent studies on the impact of various forms of mindfulness and meditation on brain functioning and morphology. Two “metastudies” (studies of studies) reviewed these experiments looking for methodological reliable and comparable results. One of these metastudies concluded “that meditation appears to be reliably associated with altered anatomical structure in several brain regions” (Fox et al. 2014 at p. 69). The brains of meditators were altered in eight brain regions including areas related to meta awareness (our ability to watch our own minds), body awareness, memory consolidation and reconsolidation, self and emotional regulation, and infra and interhemispheric communication (Fox et al. 2014; see also Afonso et al. 2020). The second metastudy concluded that meditation produces positive effects on cognitive and emotional processes (Sedlmeier et al. 2012). Several individual studies raise intriguing possibilities. For example, one study found that meditators, unlike control subjects, had reduced activity in “self-referential processing,” i.e., mind wandering, which appears to be our default mechanism and is often correlated with unhappiness (Brewer et al. 2011). Another study found that meditation increased compassionate responses to suffering, even in the face of social pressures to avoid so doing (Condon et al. 2013).

As noted, these changes in brain function and form do not occur without sustained and repeated effort, however. Absent focused attention, the brain will produce predictable patterns of brain activity, that is, our default mode of thinking. Through choice and willful attention, however, it appears that an alternative synaptic path may be activated and perpetuated. The idea that immaterial forces such as intention and attention could shape the brain’s function and form runs counter to classical materialist science. Working in the materialist tradition, most scientists, including almost all neuroscientists, have assumed that mental processes are inefficacious byproducts of purely physical brain processes. To the extent that one can recognize the mind at all, brain to mind is a one-way street. All our thoughts and actions are reducible to impersonal, microscopic, physical processes. Nothing that is nonphysical, such as the mind, consciousness, or will, can even exist in the sense of being a measurable, real entity much less shape physical outcomes.

This classical approach has been unable to explain how brain activity gives rise to consciousness (subjectively felt mental states), however, and what role consciousness might play in the brain’s workings. Why, if exclusively local physical processes in the brain control us, do we possess a stream of conscious thoughts capable of understanding large-scale phenomena? After 350 years of classical material science and more than half a century of neuroscience, materialist approaches have done a good job of linking structure and function in the brain, but have made no progress in explaining consciousness, something we all experience most all the time. In the materialist paradigm, accounting for consciousness is the “hard problem,” and because consciousness cannot be effectively explained by reference to material forces, for most scientists in the classical material tradition, consciousness either is not a legitimate area of inquiry or, if it is, they have promised, since the eighteenth century, that a materialist answer to the hard problem of consciousness is only a matter of time (Araujo 2012).

The idea that the process of brain wiring and rewiring is shaped by immaterial mental events may confound classical materialist science (which either denies mind or separates mind from matter), but it is not inconsistent with quantum science (which sees mind and matter as inextricably entwined). Recall that in the quantum world, the subject determines which of many possible realities becomes actualized through its intention and attention. Quantum theory reunites consciousness with the causal structure of nature, joining subjective experience and objective outcomes. Thus, quantum theory creates a “causal opening for the mind,” a point of entry by which mind could alter the functioning and shape the physical structure of the brain.

Is there evidence for the existence of a “quantum brain” or “quantum consciousness?” At this point we do not know, and it remains to be seen where, if anywhere, there exists a demonstrable locus for quantum effects in the brain. Because the environment for sustained quantum effects to operate in the brain has not been sufficiently established, traditional neuroscience argues that brain functions can, indeed must, be understood as the interactions of neurons operating under classical physical principles. Still, we know that quantum physics operates sub-atomically everywhere, and we know that mechanical explanations of neuronal function cannot account for the processing speed of the human brain. Furthermore, there is evidence that sustained thought alters brain states and traits; we just do not know how or precisely where this occurs. Quantum theory raises the following question to material neuroscience: How can the mind and consciousness be reduced to the function of atoms within the brain if we know that ultimately these atoms have no fixed or non-probabilistic existence outside of subjective mental events? If atoms derive their properties from interaction with consciousness [in quantum], how can consciousness depend only on those same atoms? (Schwartz and Begley 2002).

In truth, at this moment, both materialism and quantum approaches toward mind are meta-physical assertions awaiting more evidence, an epistemic exercise. Science should be about epistemic pursuits, not metaphysical closure, so let us keep an open mind. Asserting that a nonmaterial force (thought) can shape a material object such as the brain, as quantum theory does, is no more speculative than asserting a material basis for nonmaterial consciousness, which is the prevailing materialist neuroscience view. With the advent of quantum theory, the nature of matter has become as problematic as the nature of mind.

Implications of New Scientific Discoveries for Social Theory

I only report on this ongoing scientific debate to consider its possible implications for the discussion at hand. As noted, some social scientists wonder “Are Buddhist ideas harmonious with science?” The answer, I suggest, is “yes,” they are remarkably consistent with the latest findings in the physical and biological sciences, not “otherworldly.”

Coming back to the focus of this discussion (and firmer footing for the author), the quantum explanations for brain plasticity and a causal role for mind carry potentially important behavioral and moral consequences for social thought and action coming from the world of science (Wendt 2015). If true, they would imply that, although we are endowed with a given brain morphology and basic circuitry, not all aspects of our responses are passively determined by neurobiological mechanisms. Instead, our volitional choices moment to moment to attend to one bit of environmental stimulation over another and to form, through our intention and attention (the driving force of karma, for Buddhists), one thought pattern rather than another, can sculpt our brain and make us who we are.

#### Embracing extinction is better than fearing it.

Batchelor ’20 [Stephen; 2020; Member of the core faculty of Bodhi College and on the Advisory Board of the Center for Pragmatic Buddhism; Tricycle Magazine, “Embracing Extinction,” vol. 30]

As he witnessed the nuclear arms race in the 1950s, Heidegger admitted that his deepest concern was not the outbreak of nuclear war. For him the greater danger was that the calculative thinking of technology would one day come to prevail as “the only way of thinking.” Were this to happen, he argued, we would lose what is most essentially human about us: that we are “contemplative beings.” The most urgent task of humanity at this time of crisis was, for the philosopher, that of “keeping contemplative thinking alive.”

To think in a more contemplative way means to slow down and recover our rootedness on Earth, which allows us to ponder and question what kind of beings we are and how best to live in this world. Heidegger called this kind of questioning the “piety of thinking.” At the heart of such contemplation lies the need to become more aware of our technological relationship to nature. This technical approach has proved so successful in everything from building skyscrapers to eliminating polio that many today regard it as simply the most reasonable way to conduct their lives. As a result, they find themselves treating life itself—and their own lives in particular—as problems to be solved by application of the right techniques.

For another 20th-century philosopher, the French writer Gabriel Marcel, our existential condition of having been born and being subject to death is not a problem to be eradicated but a mystery to be embraced. A problem, for Marcel, always stands apart from the one confronting it, whereas a mystery is inseparable from the one who embraces it. As the person who falls sick, ages, and is destined to die, I cannot stand outside these processes in order to treat them as problems to be solved. Instead, I can open myself to the mystery of being here and embrace it in wordless astonishment. Unlike a problem, which vanishes as soon as it is solved, the more deeply we penetrate a mystery the more mysterious it becomes.

In coming to view life through the lens of technology, we risk losing a sense of our unfathomable poignancy and strangeness. In order to manipulate technically the physical and mental elements of our world, they need to appear to us as discrete, definable, readily graspable objects. Only then can we confidently embark on bending them to our will. “A world where techniques are paramount,” remarked Marcel, “is a world given over to desire and fear; because every technique is there to serve some desire or fear.” Heidegger was concerned that a world dominated by technology would accelerate out of control and overwhelm us. In the 1950s he hoped that humanity might wake up to this danger and recover a more contemplative relationship with life before it was too late. As the power and reach of industrial technologies expanded relentlessly, he lost this hope. In an interview conducted in 1966 that was published after his death in 1976, he remarked: “Now only a god can save us.”

Three years later, in 1979, the first governmental climate study reported that, at current rates, carbon emissions from human activities would increase the average surface temperature of the globe by between 2.0 and 3.5 degrees Celsius, doubling the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere by 2030, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

‘Whoever would tend to me,” said Gotama to a group of followers who had neglected one among them suffering from dysentery, “he should tend to the sick.” On arriving at the community, Gotama and his attendant Ananda had entered a lodging to find a mendicant lying alone on the floor in a pool of his own excrement. They bathed and cleaned him, lifted him up and laid him on a couch. Gotama then reproached the other mendicants for failing in their ethical obligations to one of their own.

In identifying himself with the sick mendicant, Gotama implies that the awakening he embodies and advocates is rooted in our capacity to care for the specific suffering of others. The episode shows this care to be a spontaneous, empathetic, and heartfelt act. It demonstrates how a healer would respond to the urgency of another person’s suffering rather than provide an abstract diagnosis of why that person is in pain. In his discourses, too, we often find Gotama evoking the hands-on skill of a physician to illustrate how to practice the dharma.

Gotama invited his followers to engage in an interconnected set of four tasks. These tasks challenge us to embrace suffering, let our reactive emotions be

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, see the stopping of reactivity, and respond with care. When facing a climate emergency that threatens the viability of intelligent life on Earth, this would entail embracing the possibility of extinction, not being paralyzed by the fear of extinction, dwelling in a space of fearless awareness, and, from there, responding appropriately to the threats that face us and future generations. The four tasks flesh out what it means to care. For Gotama, care is the cardinal virtue that encompasses all others. His final recorded words were: “Things fall apart; tread the path with care.”

To practice such care does not require believing in rebirth and the law of karma, or insisting that craving is the cause of suffering and nirvana its cessation. Such beliefs can stand in the way of a wholehearted engagement with the threat of ecological catastrophe. During an interview in 1989, when asked whether a Buddhist would be concerned about environmental destruction, the Dalai Lama replied: “A Buddhist would say it doesn’t matter.” For even if the world were to become uninhabitable and mass extinction ensued, the sentient beings who perished would be reborn according to their karma in another realm in this or some other universe. Buddhists may well feel deep compassion for those who suffer the consequences of climate change and may do their best to alleviate that suffering, but in the end some form of consciousness will survive death and be reborn. What really matters is to free oneself from the cycle of rebirth and attain the eternal peace of nirvana.

For orthodox Buddhists (like Hindus and Jains), not to be born and not to die are preferable to birth and death. As the end of suffering, nirvana, therefore, is also the end of life. While Mahayana Buddhists renounce nirvana and vow to be reborn out of compassion for others, they do so only as long as there are sentient beings still trapped in the cycle of birth and death. Once the bodhisattva has liberated all these beings, she too enters nirvana and is born no more. Although this may take an immeasurably long time, the same underlying principle holds true: not-life is preferable to life.

The four tasks, by contrast, demand direct engagement with life itself irrespective of any a priori beliefs about the origins and end of suffering or the nature of the self. By entering into a contemplative, empathetic, and existential relationship with the pain of the world, one seeks to respond with situation-specific compassion. The challenge is to tackle the crisis at hand, which may be unprecedented, and find imaginative responses that may not have occurred to anyone before. Taking into account the causal role played by psychological factors such as greed, dislike, and stupidity, one’s primary concern is to arrive at a response based on an understanding of the full range of particular conditions—biological, social, economic, religious, and political—that underlie and contribute to the crisis.

A traditional Buddhist meditation on death requires that you contemplate the certainty of your own death and the uncertainty of its time, and then dwell on the question of how, given this mortal condition, you should live now. Expanding this personal reflection to include Homo sapiens as a species, the meditation would look like this:

Extinction is certain;

The time of extinction is uncertain;

How should we live now?

Extinction is certain. Either the human species will evolve into a form of life that we cannot now even imagine, or, if we manage to survive in a more or less humanoid form, we will be wiped out when the sun becomes too hot to sustain life on Earth in around a billion years’ time. Yet neither of these scenarios is certain. A massive meteor impact, a highly virulent disease, volcanic eruptions, nuclear devastation, or the repercussions of climate change could terminate human existence much sooner, possibly within this century.

Just as death focuses attention on what matters most for you as an individual, extinction focuses attention on what matters most for us as a species. In embracing extinction, we become intensely conscious that we are complex thinking, feeling, sensing, caring creatures who emerged from millions of years of evolution by natural selection. For self-aware animals like you and me, to contemplate extinction can open up an astonished, quasi-religious wonder at the grandeur of being alive at all.

### Collective Bargaining---Link

#### ‘Collective bargaining’ requires classical economics.

Chang ’19 [Otto; 2019; Professor of Accounting at Purdue University; Hualin International Journal of Buddhist Studies, “Wisdom-Based Economic Theory as Informed by Buddhism,” vol. 2]

The Buddhist view on the development of human potential and the dual role of labor in the development of modern economy is consistent with the social justice call reflected in religious proclamations, the modern labor movement, and progressive managerial practices. For example, the encyclicals of Pope John Paul II (especially Laborem Exercens, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, and Centesimus Annus) and the 1986 United States’ Bishops’ pastoral letter on the economy (Economic Justice for All) clearly stated the value of human dignity, safe working conditions, and equitable distribution of income.27 The modern labor movement and the formation of labor unions in the twentieth century represent initial actions taken by the workers in their struggle to improve their working conditions and their shares of economic income. Their struggle and battle, however, are still based on the classical economic framework of treating labor as means rather than ends. The acceptance of the market mechanism as the basic economic model in their collective bargaining process is self-devaluating and contributes to the decline of the union in the last two decades of the twentieth century.28 Because of increasing economic uncertainty and rapid technological changes, there is an increasing emphasis on the development and empowerment of employees in corporate America. More and more companies have realized the important impact of quality employees on their bottom line. Spending on employee training and development is considered essential in maintaining competitiveness in the global market. Many Fortune 500 companies have made employee training and development one of their strategic goals. The achievement of this goal is formally evaluated annually in a performance evaluation scheme called ‘balance scorecard’.29 Although the motivation behind this trend is still profit, it corroborates the statement that labor is not just an input factor but also a goal by itself.

#### That legally enshrines selfish competition and consumption over quantifiable resources as a natural state. That abdicates moral responsibility.

Tideman ’11 [Sander; 2011; Senior Research Associate at the Business & Society Center of Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation – A Buddhist Approach, “Gross National Happiness,” Ch. 7]

Economics has its roots in ancient Greece (the term is derived from oikonomikos, literally meaning “household management”), and now is commonly defined as “a science that studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means with alternative uses” (Robbins 2002). In this discussion, it is important to note that economics defines ends and means primarily in material terms, which moreover can be quantified in monetary terms. Immaterial and non-monetary values are considered subjective and therefore outside its scope. Further, by stating that economic means are naturally limited and scarce, economic theory accepts a natural element of competition for these resources.

In addition to assuming that we naturally compete for scarce and limited material resources, economic textbooks assume that well-being is achieved by consumption of these resources. Happy is the one who consumes, unhappy is the one who does not. Classical economics tell us that it makes no sense to exert time, effort or expense on non-consuming activities, such as maintaining values, if money can be made by ignoring them. Intangible values don’t really count (Robbins 2002).

The assumptions underlying the so-called “economic laws” were developed at a time when religion was being separated from science, the accepted worldview became secularized, and the sacred was substituted by belief in matter. Economic theory was affected by great scientific discoveries in physics, biology and psychology, and economic laws were presented with the same authority as laws of nature. Newton and Descartes described reality in terms of a more or less fixed number of “building blocks”, of “things”, subject to measurable laws such as gravity and, put together smartly, operating like a big machine. The world of matter was regarded as a mere machine, to be used by man, his reason and free will.

When Adam Smith, in his famous work “The Wealth of Nations” (1776), introduced the “invisible hand” of the market, by which the things and building blocks can be exchanged efficiently on the basis of each individual’s self interest, we extended these laws into the realm of economics. 19th century economists such as Malthus and Ricardo, added the notion that economies are closed systems, bound by fixed quantities of material goods. No matter how large economies become, they remain closed, thus limited. This has led to an important premise underlying classical economics: scarcity is a natural state. Hence it is believed that competition for scarce resources, or even war, is natural too. We forgot that Adam Smith wrote in his earlier work, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1982) that markets could not function without ethics and morals. We have come to believe that greed and selfishness is what economies are all about.

This worldview was solidified when Darwin described human beings as a relatively intelligent species evolved from primitive apes motivated by lusts and aggression (as Freud would confirm later in psychology). Our intelligence has taught us to behave socially, but fundamentally we are selfish beings subject to the law of “survival of the fittest”. Even though this worldview is now no longer recognized as scientific but as a belief system now called “scientific materialism” (Wallace 2007), it is still holding sway over our economic thinking.

E.F. Schumacher observed in his landmark book “Small is Beautiful” that the idea of competition, natural selection and the survival of the fittest, which purports to explain the natural and automatic process of evolution and development, still dominates the minds of educated people today. Schumacher argues that

These ideas, combined with the belief in positivism, have wrongly been given universal validity. They simply do not stand up to factual verification. But since they conveniently relieved us from responsibility – we could blame our immoral behavior on ‘instincts’ – these ideas have retained a prominent place in the consciousness of modern man (Schumacher 1973).

## Framework

### Tanhā---Framework

#### Universal impermanence makes suffering inevitable, turning case and corroding value to life. Thus, radical acceptance of the status quo is a more virtuous choice than participating in the 1AC’s fantasy of control.

Meiklejohn ’19 [Brad; 2019; Alaska State Director for The Conservation Fund; Rewilding, “A Buddhist View of Conservation,” https://rewilding.org/a-buddhist-view-of-conservation/]

We suffer when we expect the world to be different from the way it is. “It shouldn’t be this way” is the perennial lament of conservationists. Here in the western world we are trained to be discerning, and we deploy our discernment to pick out all the things that are wrong in the world. And when we start looking, we start finding: climate chaos, species extinction, and the familiar list of worldly woes. It has long been this way, as the Roman historian Tirulean observed in 150 AD:

All parts of the earth are built over, trampled, full of commerce. Farms and fields drive back the forests. Even rocks are cultivated. Swamps are drained. Today’s towns outnumber yesterday’s houses. Everywhere on earth are residences, peoples, governments and human growth so clogs the world it can barely support us. And as our needs increase we struggle with each other for them and nature fails us.

When we hold an idealized view of the how the world should be, our happiness and satisfaction rest on an unattainable perfect future state. “If only we could stop the Pebble mine…if only we could save the Arctic Refuge…if only so-and-so were not president.” But “if only…” is a future that never arrives. Even when our wishes come true, we find something else to despair over, some other “if only” to pin our hopes on. Our default mode of finding faults has a corrosive effect on all aspects of our life.

Yet the world is the way it is. The world will always be imperfect. The world is not here to make us happy nor will it ever be the way we want it to be. How could it be otherwise? There are nearly 8 billion people who want the world to be a certain way, and only one world.

When we don’t accept things as they are, we suffer. This suffering comes in various forms for conservationists: frustration, outrage, anger, disappointment, despair, resentment, and stress are common among us. To be clear, we create this suffering. It is our choice to be frustrated, angry, or resentful, yet these states of mind do nothing to improve the situation and render us less effective. “The world is not coming at you, it is coming from you” as the Vietnamese Buddhist Thich Nhat Hanh says. What we think and feel is what we project. “With our thoughts we create the world,” said the Buddha.

The Buddhist way is not a path of resignation, however. It is a path of radical acceptance of things as they are. “It’s like this now” is a helpful refrain that short-circuits anger, frustration and despair. Acceptance can easily lead to indifference, though, unless it is harnessed to a higher purpose, such as the Bodhisatva aspiration “Beings are numberless. I vow to save them all.” The magnitude of this ambition, in full view of reality, takes the pressure off an impossible task. We do the work because it is the right thing to do, not to finish the job. Our path is endless. There is nothing to achieve and nowhere to go.

We cannot control the results of our efforts. The only thing we can truly control is our intention. When our intentions are wholesome, our work will produce wholesome results. If our actions are tinged with greed, hatred or delusion, we will reap the consequences. Dishonesty and deceit will undermine our own work. We can rest in the knowledge that those who pillage the environment will reap their karma, and we will inherit our own.

As conservationists we spend a lot of time communicating. I have often heard it said that we are conversationalists more than conservationists. But how are we communicating? Many conservationists come across as shrill, pedantic and righteous — not particularly attractive traits. What is the intention of our communication? Are we aiming to win, to convince, to belittle, to impress, to gain attention or are we merely stating what we know to be true? We must clearly set our intention before we communicate.

The Buddha placed particular importance on right speech, which for our purposes encompasses all forms of communication, including texts, tweets, phone calls, emails, grant applications, memos and letters. The Buddha defined right speech as speech that is true, timely, beneficial, endearing and agreeable. He placed special emphasis on truthfulness: “For the person who lies, there is no evil he might not do.” The German philosopher Nietzche said: “It’s not that you lied that bothers me. It’s that now I can never trust you.” Is all of our speech impeccably true, or do we exaggerate or shade the truth to bolster our side of the story? Is our speech harsh or divisive, or is our speech pleasing and intended to bring others together? Gossip, idle chatter, useless talk and speculation, all forms of wrong speech, were encompassed by the onomatopoetic term “sampapalapa” in the Pali language of the Buddha’s time.

Conservationists often divide the world into “us” and “them.” “They” are the problem and “we” have the solution. “If only they weren’t so greedy…so selfish…so ignorant…so lazy.” But there is no them, just us. We are all 99.99% the same. We all have the same impulses, emotions, and desires. We all want what is best for us and we all have our own answers to what is best for us. The Buddha identified the delusion of a separate self as a root problem, and today we are witnessing an epidemic of self that manifests in widespread anxiety, depression, drug addiction, and suicide. Our actions as conservationists should be selfless not selfish. By acting from compassion and generosity we transcend the polarization of “us” and “them.”

David Brower, a legend in conservation said, “All our victories are temporary and all of our defeats are permanent.” We know that conservation work requires (to borrow from another conservation legend, Brock Evans) relentless pressure, relentlessly applied, as we often fight the same battles over and over. The Buddha observed that impermanence is one of the three immutable characteristics of life. Change is constant; nothing lasts. “It is a bold thing for a human being who lives on the earth but a few score years at the most to presume upon the Eternal and covet perpetuity for any of his undertakings,” said wilderness warrior Howard Zahnhiser. We cannot ever achieve a permanent state of perfection or protection, and even the most devastating defeats give rise to future opportunities.

Conservation is a relay race, not a sprint, with the baton of obligation passed from one generation to the next. We cannot save all there is to save in our lifetimes. Trying to do too much too fast and too often brings on the dis-ease of “busy-ness.” Ask a fellow conservationist how they are and, more often than not, you get back the response: “Busy.” Busy has become the modern badge of self-worth, as if by proclaiming our busy-ness we fend off the nagging worry that we are not doing enough.

I would prescribe three things for modern conservationists: gratitude, immersion in nature, and meditation. Like a border collie that needs a job, we can give our discerning minds the task of finding what is right with the world, rather than all that is wrong. A daily gratitude practice of, say, making a list of five things you are grateful for, will bring benefits to your work and your life.

“Save it because you love it,” says western Dharma teacher Jack Kornfield. But you have to know it before you love it. I am always dismayed by how little time modern conservationists spend in wild nature. Every person working in conservation should take at least one 10-day trip into wild nature each year. And get paid to do it. Shorter trips just don’t cut it because it takes several days just to disconnect from the buzz of the modern world and reconnect with the slower, deeper rhythms of nature.

Deep time in the wildness will ground you in reality and will defuse the hecticity that renders most of us too distracted to be effective. Meditation provides the same grounding, and is a portable refuge that will make you more patient, more caring, more present, less angry, less stressed and less prone to burnout. If that is not enough, the Buddha also assured that mediation would improve your complexion, help you sleep better and draw rare, shy animals near! Don’t just take my word, or the Buddha’s. See for yourself.

### Obscurity---Framework

#### Legal engagement collapses lived experience into tangible state action, facilitating state addiction AND authorizing artificial legitimacy through paternalism.

Schonthal ’16 [Benjamin; 2016; Professor of Buddhist Studies and Head of the Religion Programme at the University of Otago; Cambridge University Press, “Buddhism, Politics, and the Limits of Law,” pp. 13-16]

On the other hand, pyrrhic constitutionalism stems from the power of constitutional discourse to shape the ways in which citizens express, conceive and deal with their differing claims about religion.38 Law, as the legal theorist Benjamin Berger argues, is not a neutral and benign curatorial tool, impartial to and aloof from the social relations it addresses. Legal discourse has its own epistemology, interpretive horizons, symbols, practices, commitments, categories and frames of experience.39 In Sri Lanka, as in most parts of the world, the constitutional management of religion draws heavily upon the language of rights, freedoms and protections – a language that represents complicated context-based social facts in more rigid terms.40 When recoded through the culture and lexicon of constitutional law and legal rights, real-world disputes among persons with complex motivations frequently take on the flavor of a clear-cut contest between rights and wrongs. A reductive economy of language also prevails: those who rely on the language of constitutional law tend to discard over time other idioms of difference (often with more flexible notions of religious identity) for a strict grammar of discrete rights and fixed communities (see Chapter 7). The rigidity of constitutional language gains a further combative quality in the standard protocols of litigation seen in most contemporary legal systems, which place court-goers in an agonistic battle between would-be winners and losers, plaintiffs and defendants, petitioners and respondents – or, as the opening anecdote dramatized, sitters and standers.

The effects of this reductive linguistic economy emerge not only in courtrooms, but also in the spread of constitutional discourse outside legal institutions. Law’s role as a technical tool of governance should not be considered apart from the broader social worlds it acts upon. In addition to the legal life of law, one must also interrogate the societal life of law – the influence of legal language and imaginaries on teachers, politicians, religious leaders, civil servants, shopkeepers and others. The language of constitutional law spreads into everyday discourse through a variety of conduits: newspapers, political speeches, novels, television dramas, radio and so on. In so doing, the very constitutional terms that harden disagreements in the legal sphere come to do the same in the societal sphere. This is certainly true in Sri Lanka, where the conduits for disseminating constitutional law include the coverage of court cases by Sri Lanka’s television and print news, the constitution-related activism of political groups, and periodic high-profile government campaigns to rewrite or revise the island’s constitution. In recent years, this diffusion of constitutional discourse has also flourished on account of a growing culture of religion-related legal activism and the regularity of Supreme Court cases in which litigants cite as a key rationale for legal action the protection of Buddhism’s “foremost place” (see Chapter 5).41

While pyrrhic constitutionalism may occur with reference to a variety of issues, religion is particularly susceptible to its effects. Virtually all constitutions mention religion, and most give an elevated legal status to protections for religion (and/or a particular religion) by assigning to it special protocols of entrenchment and justiciability. Equally important is the unique polysemy of religion as a legal category. Unlike other polysemous legal rubrics (such as equality or freedom), constitutional actors invoke religion not only as an abstract entity, a general term of classification, but as a concrete thing in the world, a tangible object of state action. Litigants, drafters, judges, lobbyists and others use the category of religion – or particular religions such as Buddhism – to denote a range of objects: institutions, texts, beliefs, property, individuals, groups, customs, rituals, economic activities, charities and numerous other things (see Chapter 6).42 Religion’s particular form of polysemy – its manifold abstract and concrete meanings – generates both conflict and concord among constitutional agents. On the one hand, clashing views about who or what should be protected under the category of religion exacerbate disputes over how to design and enforce constitutional policies for religion. On the other hand, the same categorical flexibility that makes religion an object of interpretive clashes also permits constitution drafters and judges to sidestep those clashes by referring to religion without defining it (or by defining it in broad and ambiguous ways). Religion is prone to pyrrhic constitutionalism because of this distinctive combination of legal weightiness and semantic lightness: virtually all constitutions give special status to the category of religion, yet the agents of constitutional law use this important category in diverging ways to serve differing purposes.4

Where they appear in this book, “religion” and “Buddhism” suggest two referents: they refer, in one way, to a shifting and unstable assemblage of material and discursive items in the world (doctrines, institutions, persons, and practices); and, in another way, they refer to the act of categorizing those items as religion or Buddhism. Pyrrhic constitutionalism unfolds, in part, through the collapsing together of these two referents. As states and citizens turn to constitutional law to manage religion, they narrow the divide between legal categories and the diversity of lived experience, between constitutional rubrics and the embodied ways of being which those rubrics imperfectly represent. They remake life in the image of law by encouraging citizens to treat constitutional discourse as a type of natural language,44 and to view their circumstances through the lexicon of religious rights, religious freedoms or Buddhism’s “foremost place.” This process renders ordinary social grievances more inflexible and uncompromising. It obscures principles of commonality, shared interests and alternative modes of compromise or coexistence. It authorizes people to speak artificially on behalf of “Buddhism” or “Christianity,” while at the same time denying or neglecting the widespread existence of subjectivities, practices, beliefs, places, institutions and socialities that blur the boundaries between religion and nonreligion, Buddhism and non-Buddhism.